Up: ARGSAFE: Using
Increasingly, safety regulatory bodies require the developers of
critical software systems to provide explicit safety cases -
defined in terms of structured arguments based on objective
evidence - in order to prove that the system is acceptable
safe [#!Simula10!#]. Argumentative-based safety cases are
progressively adopted in the defense (UK), automotive,
railways, off-shore oil & gas, or medical device domains.
Consequently, this research aims i) to identify links between
argumentation theory and engineering of safety systems,
ii) to develop argumentation methods to transfer confidence in
safety-critical software systems.
iii) to apply the developed technical instrumentation at two case
studies: 1) safeness of autonomous driving software, respectively
2) justifying correctness of firewall configuration.
System capabilities include 1) automatic norm checking for
compliance, 2) safety reports generation, 3) facilitating
understanding and confidence transfer.
The top level scientific objective regards safety assurance of
software systems by means of argumentation theory. A second
objective would be to increase the cooperation of the research
groups from Technical University of Cluj-Napoca with those from
Universidad National del Sur.
Two strategies are enacted to achieve it: 1) writing papers with
authors from both countries and
2) organising a workshop in Romania and one workshop in Argentina.
We intend to co-locate the Romanian workshop with the 10th
International Conference on Intelligent Computer Communication
organised by the Computer Science Department of TUCN on September
2014. A traditional track of the conference is represented by agreement
technologies and argumentative agents, which is in
line with the topic of the bilateral project.
Objectives of the ARGSAFE project.
|| Associated Tasks
| Jun 2013
|| O1. Analysis the problem of
justifying safeness of complex technical
|| Identifying the possibilities of
integrating argumentation theory, quality
standards and ontologies.
|| Formal analysis of quality standards.
Identifying factors affecting confidence in
safeness of software systems.
| Sep 2013
|| O2. Developing the assurance model
based on argumentation theory.
|| Justificative reasoning in the
context of heterogeneous and contradictory
|| Developing the defeasible
justification logic. Contextualising evidence.
| May 2014
|| O3. Developing the system of
justifying safeness of complex technical system.
|| Automatic identification of
|| Developing a generic ontology for
hazards. Organising the first ARGSAFE workshop.
| Sep 2014
|| O4. Applying the system for safeness
assurance of autonomous driving systems.
|| Organising evidence, building
arguments and counter-arguments.
|| Formalising safeness requirements.
Formalising assumptions regarding operating mode
and specific hazards.
| Dec 2014
|| O5 Applying the system for verifying
correctness of firewall configuration
|| Presenting arguments for decision
support under temporal constraints
|| Identifying inconsistency in security
rule-based systems. Organising the second
| Mar 2015
|| O6. Developing a methodology of
exploiting structured arguments in safeness
|| Re-using safety cases. Re-engineering
complex software systems based on arguments.
|| Defining patterns of safety cases.
Stating the principle of building arguments when
developing complex software systems. Identifying
applications for the proposed model.
Up: ARGSAFE: Using